For a very long time, it has been considered that what we ought to do must be decided based upon the idea of what the objective of such an action ought to be. Easier to be said, it has been one’s value judgment on which our ethics and moral acts are based, as far as what ought to be represent the idea of our moral duty. Such judgment is appropriate if the value in concern is normative in relation to the common good, which is changeable, good or worse, and is apart from the concept of absolute good. Yet everybody has own certain ideals that determine the direction of one’s judgment. If such a value is not a fact in any conceivable ways, then how good is such judgment in relation to our moral imperative? Validity of judgment derives from what fact (or facts) such judgment is based upon; making judgment, in order for it to be good, is based on facts and not values, however describable and descriptive those values might be. However, one might argue that our moral judgment and thereby moral act must originate from the idea of what we ought to be and ought to do, the values that have been almost imperceptible in any naturalistic ways. Why cannot we do what we ought to do simply because that’s what it is – without a fear of making the naturalistic fallacy?

Naturalistic fallacy is the error in drawing conclusions about what ought to be from the grounds that make only what is in fact the case. In making judgment, one might regard certain relations inevitable among premises concerning what something is, is not, ought and ought not, and may consider such relations or assertions necessary to be explained in logical manners and observed in experiences. Being mixed up in such relations, apparently claimed to be the false ones, has long been considered fallible in the fields of philosophy and sciences; now such a notion of the fallacy itself might be a sham, in views of metaethical deliberation of logic.

In ethics, the naturalistic fallacy can be explained as a type of apparent logical error in reasoning that non-moral premises entail moral conclusions. In moral systems of logic, an argument begins with the statement of facts that concern what is, which entails that one ought to act in certain way because of the fact. However, it has been considered erroneous to reason such necessity of moral acts from what merely is in its nature, because the deduction of an ought in a conclusion is perceived logically invalid and/or unsound unless oughts, rather than mere facts, appear in the very premises.

Labeling such kind of logic (or illogic) as the naturalistic fallacy may be appropriate because arguing in such a way concerns, or centers upon the concepts of what is natural. The idea of nature is commonly understood as the work of God, set aside from the concept of God as far as the nature is not considered a part of God. Problems arise over such status of nature and thereby justification of such theories of nature that defines what is natural. Suppose Deity, or the status and quality of the godly nature, with the lack of proper names to be attributed, is described as good. The good nature, further reduced in human terms as a part of what is natural, needs to be the objective of moral acts so that such moral acts and thus justification of those acts are indeed natural to humans.

However, such moral acts are that we consider what we ought to do, and drawing a conclusion with regard to particular moral act must be from what ought to be in its nature, and such an argument is invalid according to the very notion of naturalistic fallacy. Because of such understanding that, the naturalistic fallacy is ipso facto a logical error, it becomes unallowable to draw a conclusion about moral acts from either what ought to be in nature or what simply is in nature. In either way, we must not misunderstand the relations between what ought to be and what is, or between what ought to be and what we consider is natural, if in fact it is true that such an argument is fallible. One might think the whole introduction of the naturalistic fallacy absurd and may be false, because there is no such thing as the naturalistic fallacy in the primacy of human logic over the concept of nature. Whatever the natural might be, such an assertion may help us make a point: the notion of naturalistic fallacy comes short as far as the validity and soundness of logic is concerned in metaethics.

In metaethics, the concept of what is natural includes not only the perceived nature of length, width, height and time, but also the nature of what is moral. The nature consists of not only space and time, but the fifth dimension, which is necessarily established by the integration of moral values and acts (and their consequences), and such fifth dimension is found and founded as the moral dimension. Set all the operations of de dicto and de re morality factors, cause levels and the works of time aside at this point, for the sake of arguing the idea of moral nature here in direct and efficient manners, let the conception of moral dimension as the fifth dimension of our universe given. Moral acts, justification of such acts and their consequences, are all describable by use of the fifth dimension, the moral scale, along which we declare the status of one’s moral act a part of nature with certain quantitative and qualitative values to certain degree.

In metaethics, aside from the concept of what is at the both ends of moral scale, there exists the status and quality of what is natural to us humans as to what we ought to do, in order to be moral and good, because that status or quality is explained in philosophical logic and observable in scientific experience. What we once thought of the naturalistic fallacy is no longer applicable to metaethical logic, because it becomes a fact that there is a relation among what ought to be, what is, and what is natural, once we conceive a five-dimensional moral world. Consider the ancient concepts in metaphysics concern only three-dimensional universe of space; also reflect on the human limitations long considered of perceiving the universe as in only four-dimensional space-time. Thinking or speaking of the naturalistic fallacy is a necessary invention (or by-product) from the idea of what the nature is; now that the nature is given the form of at least five dimensions, it is then necessary to reconsider whether such a notion of fallacy is apt in the first place.

What lies at the beginning or at the end, or beyond such extremities, must be the only question with regard to what is natural to our human experience, because that concerns the status and the quality of what is absolutely good and godly. It is moral to define that the dictates of the human conscience are necessarily relative and fallible in relation to God’s ideal and omnipotent commands. That said, the nature of moral good is actually only ethical, the studied status of morality, in our expanded idea of the universe in five dimensions, or only moral to certain degree, because the absolute concept of morality may lie beyond the reach of our perceived moral dimension. However, even if what is moral is not a part of our nature, we at least have the scale of how moral particular act is, or the measure of one’s ethical succession, by use of the moral dimension with values attached to the fifth dimension of the universe.

The relations between what is moral in nature and what ought to be in our human nature are perceptible, at least in its approximation, when we set the values of moral dimension in a five-dimensional universe, whether it is a closed domain or is in relation to what is absolute beyond our imagination or reach by ourselves. Here, in this approximated logical world of moral nature, our moral act is the product of our own moral justification. Moral judgment we make is based not on values but the fact that such an act of what ought to be is measured by what its moral status is; therein values are instead mere descriptive features that come along with the scale of ethical succession, which validates one’s moral judgment as factual, and valuable as well.