What is the alternative to violence?

INTRODUCTION

I will argue in this paper that the United States, in engaging itself in a “War or Terrorism” has plainly abandoned any pretence that conflicts or the root of such conflicts can be dealt with through dialogue, negotiating and reconciliation. Most Americans would now see the military approach as the only viable option in responding to the 9/11 attacks. Terrorism must be rooted out. If the terrorists are allowed “to get away with it” many experts assert, more attacks will likely follow.

While the response of the US is understandable, given the provocation, I will argue that the “War on Terrorism” will ultimately only serve to drive the escalation spiral ever higher. It is the view of many in the conflict resolution field that by waging war, the US will create more enemies of America and bring on more hate, more fear, and more violence and terrorism. The recent attacks against foreign workers compounds in Saudi Arabia are clear examples of that escalation.

What are the alternatives to the war? Was there an effective non-violent response to the September 11 attack? Is there still a nonviolent option? How should the Conflict Resolution paradigm respond in order to validate its theories and practice?


THE TERROR

“The New millennium has begun with two monstrous crimes: the terrorist attacks on September 11, and the reaction to them, surely taking a far greater toll of innocent lives.” On Sept 11, 2001, alleged members of the Al Qaeda network, whose spiritual leader is the Saudi renegade, Osama bin Laden, flew three airplanes into targets within the American heartland, destroying the twin Trade towers in New York City and badly damaging a part of the pentagon in Washington, DC. In a microsecond, the world changed dramatically. Or perhaps, closer to the truth, the United States changed dramatically in ways that are still unfolding. The US, a proud nation which had never previously suffered a single serious attack on its soil, was profoundly humiliated. “America was under terrorist attack,” therefore, “the hegemon must hunt down its foes to the last man and to the ends of the earth.”

THE US RESPONSE TO 9/11

In response to those atrocities, the United States is currently engaged in a "War on Terrorism." The goal of this war is said to be “the elimination of terror as a viable option for obtaining a group's interests or needs.”

The attack came at a peculiar time in American political history. In 2000, the US electorate had, reluctantly chosen George W. Bush (son of George Bush Sr.), a little -known conservative politician with a relatively thin resume. Perhaps no president in modern times had as little experience and knowledge of the world as Bush Jr.
At the outset, Bush deliberately surrounded himself with many conservative political advisors and right-wing ideologues. The philosophy of the Bush administration appeared to be a narrow one: pro-America, pro-business, laced with a large dose of conservative Christian fundamentalism.

Scoffed at as a lightweight, sorely lacking in charisma and oratorical skills (compared to Bill Clinton, for example), and considered by many to have stolen the election in Florida, Bush floundered through the initial months of his term, and appeared destined to a one-term presidency. Then came 9/11. In a single day, the old political order was swept away, leaving George Bush alone on the national stage, with a unique opportunity to shape an entirely new course for America.
Within a month, the outline of America’s response to this changed world became clear. The US quickly mounted a military campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, purported protectors of Bin Laden. America’s answer was bombs and special forces, not dialogue and negotiations. In the US view, “the only language they [the terrorists] understand is that of force.” Fuelled by the public anger post 9/11 and driven by a black and white view of human history, the Bush administration was relentless and uncompromising in its new approach to world affairs.
As one investigates the September 11 attacks, for example, it quickly becomes evident that the issues involve all of the “religious, political, economic, and social differences between the United States and Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and to some extent the broader Islamic world. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is part of the story.” The possibility that the US policy itself may have had some small role in creating the conditions for 9/11 was not a view widely held within the US.

One of the major barriers to effective conflict resolution is the fact that parties to intractable conflicts seldom have a realistic image of what peace would look like or how it would be structured. The assumption is simply that the ‘bad guys’ will disappear, or somehow stop being ‘bad’. But successful peacebuilding requires a much clearer and more realistic image of what end results are both achievable and desirable.

It is much easier to get the parties to abandon destructive and counter-productive conflict processes if they have a clear and realistic image of a more desirable future that they would like to pursue. Visualization processes and related interventions can facilitate development of such images. Such arguments found no favor among US policy –makers.


AN EYE FOR AN EYE

It was evident immediately that neither party in this conflict was seeking dialogue or a peaceful means to settle the issues. The ‘Law of the jungle’ was clearly in force. 3000 lives were lost in the Trade Center attack; in return, at least 3000 people died in Afghanistan as result of ‘mis-targeting’, not to mention the creation of a ‘refugee crisis’ on a large scale. The parties to the conflict chose “confrontations in which they conclude[d] that they must devote all available resources to the destruction of their enemies.”

DEFINITIONS OF TERRORISM

Since the attacks on the Twin Tower and the Pentagon were classified as an act of terrorism, we need to look closely at the nature of terrorism before leaping into an analysis of how it has been responded to. “There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism, and most definitions offered in the international arena are tainted by self-serving motivations.” Still, we need to arrive at a working definition of the term “terrorism” in order to be able to discuss the topic in a useful way.
Terrorism is sometimes defined as “violence or the threat of violence calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm, in a word, to terrorize and thereby bring about some social or political change”, which emphasizes the reason behind the terrorist act.

Another plausible definition is “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”
This is fine but we must be careful not to define terrorism in a political way, that is describing it by who does it or who it is done to, rather than what it actually is. If we are not careful, we end up with useless distinctions such as ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.’ This overly general definition could merely catalogue all kind of activities that a given ‘government’ disapproves of. Terrorism thus becomes “the violence committed by those we disapprove of.”
In the view of many (especially outside of the United States), terrorism is the “inevitable product of oppression” . Thus “September 11 was a retaliation… motivated by a combination of hatred and despair.”

Thus we see an essential conundrum of terrorism. In the view of many in the Islamic world, the third world and even Europe, the terror attacks were symptomatic of an animosity to the United States, to the existing world economic order, and to unpopular US policies in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and many other countries. In the US view, America is a great nation, a democracy, who people are good and just. How could anyone hate us? It is like these people are on two different planets. Ironically, the US seems to be reacting by resorting to exactly the same policies and the same behavior that got it into this pickle in the first place. We need to look more closely at US policy in the world of post 9/11.

WITH US OR AGAINST US

For George W. Bush and his neo-conservative advisors, the world is a very simple place.
‘Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists,’” in his declaration of war on terrorism with over 60 nation-states already identified as hostile. Every nation has a ‘choice to make; there is no neutral ground’. Bush and his people clearly have a master plan in mind, one that seems to include a makeover for a large part of the world that does not particularly like the United States. As he stated blatantly in his address to the nation on October 7 2001, “Today we focus on Afghanistan, but the battle is broader.”
It was significant that the U.S. framed this conflict as a ‘war,’ as opposed to a ‘criminal act’. In retaliation for September 11 attacks, “the world’s most powerful nation launched its tremendous might against one of the poorest, most war ravaged and desperate countries in an act of vengeance.” This shows how destructive such framing can be.

The president sought to draw parallels with the World War II era, which was the last time the country had been totally united in the quest to win a war against adversaries who were clearly identifiable and, even more important, clearly “evil”. The president asked for and received “wartime powers” similar to those invoked in WWII. Declaring itself to be “at war”, the US used all its considerable might and resources to pressure recalcitrant allies and other nations in its cause. Pakistan, Russia, China and many nominally pro-US countries in the Middle East were bullied, threatened or bribed into joining the “war” effort. Within the US, the government used all means fair and foul to round up suspected supported of Al Qaeda. After the Afghan war, the US shipped many prisoners to its base at Guantanamo, Cuba, where many of the normal legal procedures for dealing with POWs and other detainees were evident only in their systematic disregard. As worrisome as all this was, it was only the beginning of a much broader scheme. This is obviously a ‘lose-lose’ situation to all parties involved in this conflict. The “old fashioned revenge policies become the order of the day,

THE NEW BUSH DOCTRINE: HIT ‘EM BEFORE THEY HIT YOU’

The scope of the new US plan became clear at the outset of 2002. In his “State of the Union” address on Jan 29, Bush began by declaring that “Our nation is at war”, (State of the Union Address, Washington, 29, Jan.) But what was to follow was even more alarming to an already nervous world. Bush went on to label three nations, Iraq, Iran and North Korea as the new “axis of evil” and called on the US and other countries to take steps against these newly identified foes . Thus Bush continued to play up the World War II themes of patriotism and all-out struggle against the forces of “evil”. From that point on, it was clear that the Bush administration had developed a master battle plan. Iraq was chosen to be first on the list and for the next year, there was an inexorable campaign to vilify the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq and to call for its overthrow. Throughout 2002, the drumbeat went on and on. The administration sought to make its case against the terrible, imminent threat that Iraq was supposed to represent. The problem for Bush and his people was that, as execrable as Saddam’s regime was, they could never find the focus and present a cogent, convincing argument for their evident intention to engineer a “regime” change” within Iraq. One week, it would be alleged “terrorist” connections, the next the terrifying arsenal of “Weapons of Mass Destruction” possessed by Saddam, the week after it was that we were going to rescue the Iraqi people from the evil, repressive Baath regime.
Clearly, Bush and his advisers had already made up their minds about Iraq and the exact justification for doing so was, ultimately, irrelevant. It would be done, willy-nilly. This fact became crystal clear in the final build-up to the Iraq war, when it was clear the US would pay no attention to the arms inspectors, the UN or any of its traditional allies. It was war, take it or leave it.

MIGHT MAKES RIGHT

Post 9/11, The “War on Terror” has become a mantra, a catch-all to justify a whole range of policies, many of which have nothing at all to do with any security threat to the United States. Even before September 2001, the Bush administration was busy laying out its new vision of America’s role in the world. If we look back to early 2001, we note that the top domestic priority for Bush was a massive, far-reaching tax cut targeted mainly to benefit upper income taxpayers and business. At the same time, Bush pushed for an increase in military spending, the first such major increase since the end of the Cold War. A corollary of these policies was a steady reduction of the federal government’s role in social and economic programs: welfare, medical insurance, protection of the environment and education. These policies reflect the strongly pro-business, laissez-faire philosophy of Bush’s main constituency.

In foreign affairs, the new administration made clear its disdain for the United Nations and most international agreements. The US refused to sign the Kyoto Accords for the protection of the world environment, angering the international community. It signaled that it would withdraw from the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM). Taking advantage of its preponderance of strength vis-à-vis Russia, the US again began to test a defensive nuclear shield, a move that many feared would trigger a new arms race worldwide. It also failed to ratify the UN convention on the international control of terrorism.
The US made clear its willingness to go it alone, according to its own perceived unilateralist security interests, without consultation with its traditional European allies and without deferring to the United Nations.
With 9/11, internal opposition to Bush’s program evaporated virtually overnight. The Democratic Party suddenly found itself outflanked on all fronts and Bush has received a get-out-of-jail-free card on almost every issue. There has been no concerted internal opposition to Bush’s policies or to his war plans. During recent Iraq invasion, there was hardly a murmur of protest among major democratic leaders. Opposition, such as it was, was left to college campuses, movie stars and marginal politicians.
It is now understood that the Bush response to 9/11 was formulated early on in the fall of 2001 and made manifest in Bush’s State of the Nation address in January of 2002. The Bush doctrine is a huge departure from a long tradition in previous US foreign policy, dating back to World War II. In his State of the Union message, Bush took pains to “extend the war on terrorism to include Iran, North Korea and above all, Iraq”, the new axis of evil. Bush stated that his goal was to oppose “the world’s most dangerous regimes” armed with “the world’s most destructive weapons”.

From that moment, it became clear to the world that the United States would use its immense military power for pre-emption and not merely “defense”. At the same time, it would be ready to use any means at its disposal to insure cooperation from allies, neutral countries and “foes” alike. The germination of this new US doctrine can be clearly seen in two important regions: South Asia and the Middle East.

The assault on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan can be taken as the model for how the US would wield its influence. As America prepared for that attack, it moved to insure that all regional powers would adhere to its basic line. Russia was brought on board and persuaded to turn a blind eye as the US established bases in the former Asian republics of the Defunct USSR (Kazakhistan, Tajikistan. At the same time, the simmering conflict in Chechnya, long a source of repression and egregious human rights abuses, was moved to the back burner. In effect, Russia was issued a carte-blanche to pursue its war against Chechnyan “terror” as it saw fit. Putin obtained “near absolution for his sins against decency in Chechnya”.

The most startling example of US willingness to renounce long-standing policies in return for support in the struggle against terror has been its new-found alliance with the military government of Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan. The US had previously been opposed to the Musharraf regime for its suppression of democratic institutions within Pakistan, its support for armed groups battling Indian rule in Kashmir and its links to suspected nuclear deals with North Korea. In a volte-face of stunning proportions, it is notable that “US allies in this war include[d] some of the most undemocratic repressive regimes in the world.”

US POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE ARAB STATES

In many ways, the United States can be said to have inherited its specific role in the Middle East from the former European colonial powers, the UK and France. The role of the colonial powers in helping to create today’s conditions is a profound one.

Following World War II and the end of colonization, the United States assumed the role as the most influential nation in the region. Up until 1989, the United States had two major policies in the Middle East. First was support for Israel, constant and unflinching over 40 years. Second was the maintenance of the status quo in the Arab nations, mainly with the view to preserving full access to the cheap oil resources in the region. A corollary was opposing Soviet influence in the region, mainly in Syria and Iraq and, prior to 1977, Egypt.

While the United States is a democracy and has pursued enlightened policies in other parts of the world e.g. Europe and Japan), American policies in the Middle East have been short-sighted and reactionary, as far as the people of the region are concerned. While not widely understood by the majority of Americans, the US can be rightly criticized for its ‘hegemonic exploitative’ foreign policy in the Middle East which has created an ‘ocean of hatred’ among the Arab masses. Al Qaeda (which, in Arabic, means the Base) has used that hatred as a base from which it has launched its attacks. “A terrorist attack leads to a massive state terrorist counter-attack which then, in turn, enlarges the ocean of hatred that not only produces terrorists but also feeds them: body, mind and spirit.”

As mentioned, the two consistent pillars of American policy in the Middle East have been Israel and oil. US interest in the region began in the 1930s with the discovery of vast oil reserves in the Gulf States, notably Saudi Arabia. “The Gulf Cooperation Council states, Iran, and Iraq jointly possess 64% of the world’s proven oil reserves. Saudi Arabia alone controls 27% of the world’s oil supplies.” The question then becomes "how to preserve the Western interest in oil and gas of the region
“Securing the flow of affordable oil is a cornerstone of US Middle East policy” Recently, the United States has experienced “an increasing dependence on imported oil, now running at over 60 per cent of consumption compared to with 10 per cent 30 years ago. A key component of US security policy has been an extensive military basing in the region, including the Fifth Fleet in the Persian Gulf and a major air force presence in Saudi Arabia. In turn, one of the major motivations of al Qaeda network, with considerable local support, has been an increasingly violent opposition to this presence.”
The US has been alarmed over the past 30 years by a series of unpredictable events in the region. The first was the Arab oil embargo in 1973, which sent US gas prices into the stratosphere. The second was the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the installation of a anti-American Islamic regime, followed closely by the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s and Saddam Hussein’s incursion into Kuwait in 1990. More and more, the US has become worried about the inherent instability in the Middle East and the fear that simply propping up client states may not be enough. The deepest worry of the US is that other states in the region may follow Iran’s example.
With the emergence of Al Qaeda and the “War on Terror”, the US simply took logic one step further. Instead of awaiting the next attack out of the region, it would act pre-emptively, and would in the words of Charles Krauthammer, opt for “a mew unilateralism” whereby the United States would refuse to play the role of “docile international citizen”.
That the US would no longer sit back and wait has been taken a step further by the conservative Bush ideologues in Iraq. Now the goal is not merely to remove a potential threat (regime change) but to go a step further. The goal of the Bushites is nothing less than the installation of a liberal democratic government in Iraq espousing American-style values. This is nothing less than “nation-building” on a grand scale. It remains to be seen whether the Americans have the stamina and the stomach for this arduous task in Iraq

US POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: ISRAEL

The second pillar of US policy in the Middle East also deserves some discussion. In fact, no analysis of the US dilemma can be complete without reference to its special relationship with Israel. Again, as in Iraq and other countries, the colonial powers play a pivotal role in creating the current mess in Palestine. The establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine in 1948, abetted by the British colonial administration, has been a soul-shaking event for its Arab neighbors and for the region at large. By steps, 1956, 1967, 1973 and more recently in Lebanon and the Occupied Territories, Israel has emerged stronger, until it has reached a point of almost total dominance of the immediate region.
For various reasons, the United States established a “special relationship” with Israel that has endured until the present day, regardless of the party or president in power. Israel has always been seen as a brave experiment, surrounded by hostile and backward enemies seeking to destroy it. In addition, Israel invokes a clear parallel to ancient Israel on biblical times, which has deep emotional appeal for many conservative Christian Americans, whose worldview is shaped more by Bible stories than by an objective reading of historical facts. Finally and of special importance today, Israel is viewed as a staunch, reliable ally in the region where friendly stable governments are few. The Bushite conservatives would like to reward Israel for its support by promoting its interests regionally and turning a blind eye to its habits of violence and repression toward the Palestinians in the West Bank. Ergo, Bush’s support for the “man of Peace”, Sharon in whatever plans he may have for the Occupied Territories.
By one count, the United States has invested about a half trillion dollars in propping up Israel. How the US efforts to democratize Iraq will go down in the region remains to be seen. Historically, the Arabs have every reason to mistrust US motives.
The Arabs see only American double standards with regard to Israel and maintenance of dictatorial regimes. US “unrepentant support of one of the world’s most notorious war criminals, Israel’s prime Minister Ariel Sharon, believed to be personally responsible for the 1982 Sabra and Chatila massacres, as well as “its eleven-year campaign of bombing and economic sanctions against the people of Iraq” . Those are all “examples of what may be described as US ‘criminal’ Middle Eastern foreign policy.” America has not attempted so far to reverse destructive dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict, except by sporadic peace plans and constant support for Israel.

WILL THE MIDDLE EAST “BUY AMERICAN”?

The United States has its work cut out for it in 1) rebuilding the Middle East using the American democratic model and 2) convincing the people of the Middle East that what it says can be trusted.
There is truly a great gap between Arab/Muslim and American perceptions of the same events which lie at the root of the present struggle which is called ‘Jihad’ by Muslim radicals and the ‘War on Terror’ by the US government.

While Osama bin Laden may be viewed as a terrorist by America and misguided by many even within the region, part of his appeal to Arabs and Muslims is that he lays out the case against the United States and its policies in crystal-clear fashion, unlike most of the governments in the region who are conspicuously silent on the issues of grievance against the United States. Bin Laden argues his grievances against the United States and the West stating that, “We ourselves are the target of killings, destruction and atrocities. We are only defending ourselves,”

Rightly or wrongly, Bin Laden has tapped into a deep well of distrust and hatred of the West, fuelled by decades of defeat, humiliation, economic stagnation and false promises. The United States has much to answer for and must prove that, thus time, bin Laden and the doomsayers are wrong. The US will go the distance and, for once, will improve the lives and prospects of the people in the region rather than furthering, as usual, the interest of the oil-men and the Israelis.

TWO VERY DIFFERENT PLANETS

Here we seem to have two worldviews of the same set of events that might as well be on different planets. An angry, self-righteous America sees itself engaged in a noble “War on Terrorism” and is now setting about on a perilous policy of regime change with the hope of pre-empting future attacks, supposedly by eliminating the conditions which it thinks have created them. Thus the leap of faith from 9/11 to Iraq, somehow equating the two and the further leap from Iraq as a “threat” to fully making over the country, by force of arms. The US has now committed itself to an incredibly difficult task of nurturing American-style values in a country it has only recently blasted to bits. This without a blueprint, without understanding the nature of the society and traditions of the people it is attempting to remake, with limited resources and questionable stamina.

Many people indigenous to the region see a totally opposite picture. An aggressive, occupying power in the tradition of colonial UK and France has bombed them into submission and is now going to tell them what kind of government and what kind of society they should have. At the same time, this very power has a terrible track record in the region. It has meddled in the region time and time again, in Afghanistan, in Iran, in Saudi Arabia, in Lebanon, in Libya and in Iraq (twice), each time applying overwhelming force to leave behind a legacy of broken promise and broken lives. In addition, this same power has consistently provided moral, economic and military support to the very nation seen as a dangerous predator in the region, a source of defeat and humiliation for over 50 years.

By its own volition, the United States has subjected itself to a period of great testing. There are two basic outcomes possible. Either the United States will stay the course (many years, even decades) and succeed in building a viable and prosperous democracy in Iraq AND in finding a just solution to the ongoing Israeli/Palestinian bloodletting.

Or, as most people in the region expect, the US will be unable to stay the course. As in Afghanistan, Bosnia and elsewhere, the US will eventually lose interest and throw in the towel when the going gets rough (as it certainly will). Americans have short attention spans in any case and some new crisis will inevitably take over the headlines and the goings on in Baghdad or Nablus will inevitably recede from US national consciousness.

If that happens, the people in the region will have their bitter expectations and their conspiracy theories confirmed once again. The war in Iraq will become, as many have predicted, a gigantic recruiting poster for bin Laden and his successors.



THE FUTURE OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

What is the future on conflict resolution in such a world as the one we see being created daily on CNN and Al Jazeera? If the world’s greatest power sees war as the only option, what hope is there for resolving any of the many international conflicts we face all over the world? Are we witnessing the dawn of a new world order based solely on force and narrow national interest? A world in which international mediators like the UN are increasingly irrelevant. If the United States fails in its ambitious program for Iraq, we will certainly see an upsurge in attacks against the US and its citizens world-wide. The window of opportunity for the United States to produce results in Iraq is almost certainly a limited one, measured in months rather than years.
But the question for thinking people is: Which is worse, for the US to fail or to succeed in its Iraqi adventure? If it succeeds, it may signal that brute force indeed pays off and may encourage further pre-emptive strikes, by the US or other powerful countries as a means to solve political problems. If it fails and Iraq tumbles into anarchy and gangsterism, and the US turns tail and bails out, bin Laden and his supporters will have won a great victory and support for his cause will grow by leaps and bounds, not just in Muslim countries but all over the world. Thus, the need for resort to the principles of Conflict Resolution is even stronger.

Either outcome would seem to be defeat for those who believe in conflict resolution. It may be that in today’s atmosphere of fear, hate and mistrust, peaceful solutions are no longer in vogue. Perhaps when the folly of these policies are exposed, there will again be a time for nations and peoples to turn to peaceful means to settle their differences. We can only hope that will be the case.

In view of the vast scope of this conflict and the potential for greater escalation, the concept of Conflict Resolution is at a crossroads. Either it will “become more
important and a ‘mainstream policy’ for all major national and international actors” or it will “disappear as a paradigm.”

In order to achieve a ‘win-win’ situation and stop the ‘evil scourge of terrorism’ all national and international actors including the so-called terrorists, the so-called victims should work together to find common ground and create a forum for ‘constructive dialogue’,

CONCLUSION

Conflict Resolution and Prevention community should create fora for a constructive dialogue, including appeals for global peace and work on problem areas to acknowledge the valid grievances of all parties and address them in a ‘problem solving’ manner. The alternative to the war is an effective non-violent response to the September 11 attack and reconciliation through dialogue and negotiations.


Huda Orfali
MA in Peace Studies & Conflict Transformation

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