Does Ambiguity Work?

by Robert M. Liu


Shortly after President George W. Bush told the media (in April 2001) that he would do whatever it took to protect Taiwan in the event of a Chinese military attack on the island, an expert on Chinese affairs with the Brookings Institution, Mr. Nicholas Lardy, came out to dismiss the Bush statement as a mistake. He said to MSNBC's Kari Huus, "The dilemma is that ... by helping Taiwan in this particular way, we may precipitate the very thing that we were trying to avoid."

At the same time, some commentators opined that the Bush statement was a deviation from America's 20-year-old "policy of ambiguity" which allowed the United States to reserve the right to protect Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act without categorically indicating what the U.S. would do if China attacks Taiwan.

Apparently, Mr. Lardy is for "ambiguity", whereas the Bush administration is for clarity. Behind Mr. Lardy's theory about the possibility of Bush "precipitating" war across the Taiwan Strait is the rationale that Taiwan might declare independence because of the Bush administration's unequivocal commitment to Taiwan's security, thereby "provoking" China to launch a military attack on Taiwan.

But is it true that "ambiguity" can prevent war while clarification of America's position only serves to "precipitate" war? At least, history does not provide proof to support this assumption. For instance, on September 1st, 1939, Nazi Germany invaded Poland because it wanted to, because militarily it was much stronger than Poland, because Adolf Hitler thought he would prevail over any potential enemy, because no one could stop him, not because of clarification of America's position on the Polish crisis or "provocation" by Poland. Hitler miscalculated, triggering World War II, and lost it.

In summer of 1990, Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait because Iraqi Dictator Saddam Hussein wanted to, because Iraq was much stronger than Kuwait, because Saddam Hussein didn't believe the United States would intervene, because no one could stop him, not because of clarification of America's position on the Iraq-Kuwait crisis or "provocation" by Kuwait.

As we can see, history has repeatedly demonstrated that miscalculation by a one-party dictatorship, rather than clarification of America's position or some smaller player's "provocation", could "precipitate" war. If "the policy of ambiguity" is designed to baffle, puzzle or mislead the leftist hardliners in Communist China's military, it might baffle, puzzle or mislead them to such an extent that they start making miscalculations and see America's "ambiguity" on the Taiwan issue as a sign of indecision, inaction, hesitation and weakness. In other words, "ambiguity" is likely to encourage adventurism among the hardliners. Would that serve America's best interests?

Since spring of 1996 when China's People's Liberation Army fired missiles off Taiwan's coast, Beijing has been escalating its saber-rattling against the de facto independent island state. It may very well be Beijing's way of requesting a clarification of America's position on the Taiwan issue, as if to ask the United States: "Would you dare intervene if we invade Taiwan?"

Apparently, the Bush administration and some of America's best-known experts on the China issue like (former U.S. ambassador to China) James Lilley believe Beijing's "request" deserves an honest reply from the United States, whereas Mr. Nicholas Lardy of the Brookings Institution seems to suggest that "ambiguity" is the smartest thing to do. However, just like they say, honesty is the best policy, whereas "ambiguity" may be too clever by half to serve the interests of peace in the Far East.

As to the possibility of Taiwan declaring independence because of America's commitment to its security, thereby "precipitating" war across the Taiwan Strait, one needs to ask two questions: (1) What could precipitate war? (2) Is it necessary for Taiwan to declare independence?

To answer the first question, history shows that if a one-party dictatorship is much stronger than its neighbor, tilting the military balance far in its favor, the temptation to invade its neighbor may become irresistible. That is to say, a deteriorating military balance could precipitate war, not so-called "provocation". As a rule, the invader has to accuse its victim of "provocation" to justify its military action. For instance, Japan invaded China in summer of 1937, accusing China of "provocation". "Provocation" is a convenient fictitious excuse for a big power to attack its weaker neighbor.

The answer to the second question: it is absolutely not necessary for Taiwan to declare independence. Taiwan's official name is The Republic of China, which was founded after Dr. Sun Yat-sen's 1911 revolution that overthrew the Qing Dynasty. The Republic of China was an independent country, whose Nationalist government in Nanking lost the Chinese mainland to the Communists in the civil war and was forced to relocate to Taiwan in 1949, while the Communists under Mao Zedong declared the founding of their own independent country, The People's Republic of China. These two political entities have been separate from (and independent of) each other for more than half a century. Why is it necessary for Taiwan (i.e. The Republic of China) to "declare independence" once again?

In addition, based on opinion surveys conducted in Taiwan, an absolute majority of Taiwanese (about 85%) are opposed to the idea of "declaration of independence". As we all know, today Taiwan is a free society with a democratically elected government. If 85% of the people in Taiwan oppose "declaration of independence", the possibility of Taiwan declaring "independence" is next to zero. It is a non-issue. Rather, the real issue that America must address is Beijing's intention to extend Communist control to Taiwan by military force.

Beijing has made clear that if Taiwan does not accept Beijing's terms and conditions for "a peaceful reunification of the motherland" (read surrender), it will use military force to accomplish its goal. Surrender or else... That's Beijing's bottom line. It has nothing to do with "declaration of independence" or "provocation" by Taiwan. It is safe to say that Beijing will continue to pursue its goal, whether America's Taiwan policy is "ambiguity" or clarity. With its missile build-up continuing in Fujian (a province across from Taiwan), Beijing's war preparations are under way. If the hardliners believe they are ready and will be able to win, war could break out like a bolt from the blue across the Taiwan Strait with or without Taiwan's "declaration of independence". Anyone who believes "ambiguity" can prevent war — or "the very thing that we were trying to avoid" as Mr. Lardy put it — must be living under a very big illusion.

Fortunately, after more than 20 years of economic reforms initiated by China's late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, the current Chinese leadership is not a leftist hardline monolith. For instance, President Jiang Zemin (who is also Secretary General of the ruling Communist Party) is a moderate (or conservative moderate) technocrat, and Premier Zhu Rongji (a graduate from Beijing's Qing Hua University who fell victim to Mao's leftist 1957 crackdown on liberal intellectuals) is another moderate (or even a closet liberal) among today's Chinese leaders.

The moderates are rational people who weigh the pros and the cons all the time. If the odds are strongly against military action against Taiwan, they would make it clear to the military. Furthermore, they must be aware that China's economic growth depends largely on U.S.-China relations. For instance, in 2000, China exported nearly US$100 billion worth of products (such as toys, sneakers, trinkets, garments and other kinds of consumer goods, accounting for nearly one third of China's GDP) to the U.S. while importing about US$16 billion worth of American products, replacing Japan as the country with the largest trade surplus with the United States. The moderates and the liberals have every reason to hope that peace will last across the Taiwan Strait, because war would mean the end of what they've been fighting for over the past two decades — economic reform.

The problem is we don't know how long the moderates can stay on top of the situation. Judging from the escalation of the hardliners' saber-rattling against Taiwan, President Jiang Zemin may not be in control of the entire military establishment. The leftist hardliners are believed to be against Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms. They know they can sabotage economic reforms by sabotaging U.S.-China relations. They definitely know the most convenient method they can use to sabotage U.S.-China relations is to rattle their sabers against Taiwan under the excuse of "the holy cause of reunification of the motherland". Who in China would dare call the leftist hardliners saboteurs of economic reform if their sabotage is done in the name of "the holy cause of reunification"?

So, what can the United States do to improve U.S.-China relations? Well, if you want to improve your relations with your neighbor and are ready to "give away the farm", so to speak, you are sure to see smiles on your neighbor's face for a period of time. But don't be surprised if he comes back one day and says that he wants your wife and your house as well. That's the downside of appeasement.

In 1938, Adolf Hitler wanted the Sudetenland — western part of Czechoslovakia. In order to improve relations with Germany (i.e. to appease Nazi Germany), Britain and France held the Munich Conference to negotiate with Hitler, promising to persuade Czechoslovakia to surrender the Sudetenland to Germany. But in March 1939, Hitler conquered the rest of Czechoslovakia. In September 1939, he took Poland as well.

To be realistic, U.S.-China relations are as good as they can be, given the inevitable ideological differences between the two countries, the U.S. being a multi-party (or two-party) democracy and China being a one-party dictatorship. The relationship couldn't be better unless the United States is ready "to give the farm away". It would be senseless to blame anybody for the current status of U.S.-China relations, because it is determined by the fundamental differences between the two countries, not by any political leader's personal will.

As long as the differences remain, we are likely to continue to hear Beijing's harangues about "U.S. hegemony", "U.S. interference in China's internal affairs" etc. etc. every now and then. Don't get upset. After a while, they will calm down and resume business as usual. After all, they have lots of toys, sneakers, garments, cheap trinkets etc. to sell to the United States of America — the largest market for Chinese products or perhaps the most generous sucker nation in history that splashes cash like water, enabling countless Chinese factories to operate with a profit, thereby keeping millions of Chinese workers on payrolls. "Fighting U.S. hegemony" doesn't make business sense.

In my opinion, rather than put the United States in a dilemma as Mr. Nicholas Lardy of the Brookings Institution suggests, the new Bush administration's unequivocal commitment to Taiwan's defense and its decision to sell state-of-the-art weaponry to Taiwan may have put China's leftist hardliners in a dilemma, because now the moderates (as well as the liberals) in the ruling Communist Party have a chance to say that the hardliners' strategy has backfired, triggering more U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

In addition, the hardliners's military threats against Taiwan have really worked like magic for America's defense industry. As is obvious, no marketing efforts by Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics could have been more effective in promoting their war planes and gunboats than Beijing's saber-rattling. Therefore, the hardliners probably deserve a hefty commission from America's arms industry. Now, the ball is in Beijing's court. It is up to the hardliners to decide whether they should continue to help Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics. They are certainly welcome to do so, as far as America's weaponry industry is concerned. It is also up to them to decide whether they should heat up the arms race across the Taiwan Strait, thereby sucking a large proportion of China's limited national resources from the economy.

But here, I have a question for Mr. Nicholas Lardy: What do you think the United States should do if China attacks Taiwan? Remain ambiguous because ambiguity works like magic? Or simply allow China's People's Liberation Army to invade Taiwan, extending Communist rule over the Taiwanese, the absolute majority of whom have categorically rejected Communism? May we have some clarification?

Born in Shanghai, China, I lived under Communist rule for more than three decades before I left for Hong Kong in early 1986 where I continued to watch China at close range for another eleven years till July 1997 when the former British crown colony was handed over to China. Maybe, I know something that Mr. Nicholas Lardy doesn't. Namely, I know how a Chinese person thinks in the Chinese language. I know "ambiguity" doesn't work with the Chinese. I know in Chinese culture, people respect clarity of purpose (i.e. honesty and straightforwardness), not mumbo-jumbo-type "ambiguity", which, in Chinese culture, is often viewed as a sign of hesitation or trickery. An ancient Chinese saying goes: In order to be a gentleman later on, one needs to be mean in the very beginning. It means one should make clear what one cannot tolerate upfront.

Besides, if I see "ambiguity" as a sign of hesitation and indecision, I have every reason to believe that Chinese leaders would see "ambiguity" as a sign of hesitation and indecision too. Brought up in Chinese culture, I believe I can read their minds more accurately than Mr. Lardy does. In fact, it is convictions such as this that drove me to write my book (A Guide to Chinese Affairs) as a comprehensive, easy-to-understand tool to help Westerners look at the China issue through an expert Chinese eye.


The End

(May 7th, 2001)