In my early days as a Marine Investigator the Chief issued me a set of legal reference books. “You’ll need these…they’re written in blood.” He said, “Poor regulation kills people.” I wondered, “Is this true ? Could maritime accidents be prevented if there was regulation in place?” In time, I began to understand a truism: many marine casualties are directly proportional to gaps in the Code of Federal Regulations.
Part of my duties was investigating marine accidents. The rest of my time I chased down mariners failing random drug tests required by the chemical drug testing regulations. Charging them with illegal drug use, I sought Suspension and Revocation action against them in accordance with the law.
One day I received a call from security informing me of a visiting mariner. Lagging slowly behind the security escort, stood a gaunt looking man. His head down, eyes to the floor, his posture showing the weight of the world. Not aware of his case and still expecting a drug case, I asked how I could help him. He said he wanted his Merchant Mariner license reinstated. Questioning further, I asked how he lost his license. There was a long drawn out silence, he swallowed and then expelled what seemed like his last breath. He looked around the room for listeners, and then quietly said, “Amtrak”…Then I understood.
Eight years earlier, this man was piloting the towboat, “Mauvilla” when it struck a train bridge in the early morning fog. The resulting collision separated the track rails sending the “Sunset Limited” to a certain death. As the speeding train approached, the Amtrak Engineer had no warning of the impending doom. Moments later, the train derailed and plummeted through the darkness into the muddy waters below killing 47 people. The tow boat pilot agreed to forfeit his Merchant Mariner License and testify to the events of the incident.
Even though the cause was not drug-related, his only hope of regaining his license was to complete Administrative Clemency proceedings. This required a stay at a drug rehabilitation facility, random drug testing and monitoring for three years, and then apply to the Coast Guard for reinstatement – all at his own expense. I watched him as I gave details of the requirements; he knew it wasn’t a good idea to pursue it any further.
The room fell uncomfortably silent. Finally I asked, “What happened?” As he began to tell his story, I could see he was reliving the incident in his mind’s eye.
“We had a string of barges ready to go up river” he said. “The fog was so thick we couldn’t see.” He continued, “I sent one of crew out to the forward barge to look for a tree so we could tie off and wait it out.” “I called another tug up ahead by radio and the other pilot said they were blind and using radar to avoid other river traffic.” There was a long pause, and then he said in an apologetic tone, “I had no choice but to continue”
Blacked out by the fog, he was unaware that he made a wrong turn and was heading straight toward a bridge. He told of his relief when he saw a line on his radar ahead of him. He thought was the image was the other towboat. As he inched along in the darkness, he thought he would soon tie up to the barges and be safe. He was wrong.
The, “towboat” on his radar was the rail bridge. The National Transportation Safety Board investigation showed the towboat Mauvilla struck the bridge causing a 38-inch misalignment of the track rails. The collision broke the barges free and the crew scrambled to locate and re-lash them to the tug. They were totally unaware of the tragedy to occur moments later. The Sunset Limited approached at a speed of over 70 miles per hour and was hurled from the bridge into the murky mud below killing 47 people.
As he retold the story, his hands shook and I could see the regret in his wet eyes as he relived each painful moment with detail. Here before me was a man living a never-ending nightmare. He studied me with his eyes, searching and hoping I would see his sorrow. I did. I wondered how this man got through each day. For days after the story I shared some of his same nightmares over this tragic incident; not only because of the horror and loss, or the detail of the story, but because it could have been avoided. He was hired by a reputable towing company, yet they failed to ensure his training and competency in the waterways they expected him to travel.
Surprisingly, the towing company, Warrior and Gulf were in full compliance with regulation and hired him based upon the minimum level of skill required by law at the time. There was no proficiency requirement to operate the radar, or even a basic knowledge of the waterway he was to push a multi-ton load of barges. In the October 2001 revision of the Code of Federal Regulations the Towing Officer Assessment Record became a requirement for Masters of Towing Vessels to prove their knowledge and training. After the most deadly train incident in U.S. history, it took eight years for Congress to pass any regulation requiring proficiency.
During the summer of 2001, I received a call regarding a collision between two vessels. A Vietnamese fisherman near Gulfport, Mississippi was tending his nets when an oncoming towboat was heading directly toward him. As the towboat headed on a collision course with the fishing boat, the young son of the fisherman called a warning to his father.
The fisherman managed to turn slightly avoiding a potentially deadly impact, still destroying the starboard bow of the small boat. The towboat continued on like nothing ever happened. I discovered the towboat Master was a 71-year old man who never saw the fishing boat and was on a dangerous medication cocktail for a series of health issues. Regulation at the time never covered age or his health condition. Rather than end the Master’s career with an Incompetence Hearing, I convinced him it was time to retire – I took his license ensuring he would never do this again.
Another deadly fissure in the regulations occurred in Oklahoma in May of 2002. The towboat, “Robert Y. Love” collided with the Interstate-40 Bridge killing 14 people, injuring five and causing over $30 Million in damages. The NTSB investigation determined the Master of the towboat had an abnormal heart rhythm causing unconsciousness as he neared the bridge. Still, there were no regulations in place requiring regular health checks and medical competency.
On October 15, 2003 the Ferryboat “Andrew J. Barberi” struck the Staten Island Ferry Terminal Dock killing 11, injuring 70 and causing over $8 Million in damages to both the vessel and the pier. According the NTSB, the Assistant Captain operating the vessel just prior to the incident became incapacitated for unknown reasons. Once again, when these incidents occurred, there were no regulations in place to ensure the medical competence of mariners.
On September 28th, 2006, the U.S. Coast Guard published a notice in the Federal Register seeking input to a proposed Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular (referred to as NVIC’s). The NVIC addressed Physical Evaluation Guidelines for Merchant Mariner’s Documents and Licenses. It’s important to note that a NVIC is nothing more than, “Guidance” whereas a regulation is a requirement. Given that distinction, even after the tragedies of both the I-40 crash in Oklahoma and the Ferry incident in New York, there still was no regulation in place seeking assurance of medical competence among mariners operating vessels on navigable waterways of the United States.
In 2004, I began investigating small ports along the California coast. This time I discovered an abyss within the regulations regarding fishing vessels and boat operators. Unlike a passenger vessel (charter boats, ferries, etc), most fishing boats operating along the coast are not required to be inspected. Given that, there is no certainty of the mechanical or structural integrity of the vessel. If the boats' condition is unknown, there is no guarantee it will be safely operable away from bridges, piers or other vessels. Each year, fishing boats are frequently involved in accidents. Reviewing the Bureau of Transportation Statistics I found there were 991 fishing boat related casualties in a single year. Yet, these vessels are still exempt from regulation and inspection.
According to regulation, Merchant Mariners holding a license are required to show they are trained, undergo a criminal background check and are subject to random drug testing. Yet, for fishing vessel operators, these requirements do not apply. During my investigation I found outlaw motorcycle gangs were purchasing small fishing boats to manufacture methamphetamine and conduct drug transfers. They would hire illegal aliens as crew, ensuring a low paid labor force, quiet for fear of deportation.
Looking back, regulations are written in not only the blood of those who fell victim to non-existent requirements, but also with the tears and shattered lives of those left behind after a maritime casualty. Then, there are those like the pilot from the Amtrak incident, traversing each day with shame and sorrow. Had there been regulation in place requiring basic competency and fitness, accidents would have been prevented and lives saved. In some ways, the threat of maritime terrorism is a lack of regulation.
Anthony M. Davis is a prior Maritime Investigator, Intelligence Officer and founder of the Homeland Security Group. He is the Author of the bestselling book "Terrorism and the Maritime Transportation System."
