A Liberal Conservative

German journalists of all political persuasions were clearly angered by the Kaiser's October 1908 effusions in London's Daily Telegraph. William understood the power of the press over the growing masses: he wanted publicity; he used it to manipulate opinion. But this time he got more than he bargained for, although, as we have seen, he was not terribly mortified by the secondary, negative coverage of the Berlin "chatterbox" press, not until his chancellor indirectly admonished him before the Reichstag, assuring the Lower House that His Highness would be a good boy in the future, even in private.

We have reservations about the memoirs we have read in this case, because memoirs, although sworn to on stacks of bibles, are not the most reliable resource for truth, especially after something awful like the Great War has occurred - perhaps lawyers are mistaken when they tell us that more lies are told in court under oath than anywhere else in the world. In any case, we do know that this historic gaffe, perhaps the greatest faux pas of the twentieth century, innocuous and boring as it may seem to us today, led to another one of William's Nervous Collapses; a German Kaiser Krisis; and an ensuing November Storm severe enough to cause His Highness to significantly lower the tone of his Imperial public relations program. But was the crisis merely a tempest in a teapot stirred up by disgruntled newspaper chatterboxes? What could the Reichstag do, short of pulling the Imperial Linchpin of Bismarck's outmoded constitution?

The Prussian King and German Emperor personally symbolized the Reich, the unity of Germany upon which a multitude of subjects were somewhat morbidly fixated: when William was a boy, a cold he had or some new toy reported in the press seemed more important to the general public than matters of state. And the German public took pride in its written word as represented by professors and writers, and tended to believe what they read; and even more so when the text was illustrated by a political cartoon. For instance we see a Simplicissimus cartoon depicting the encirclement of Germany by its mortal enemies: a bearded German is in bed with his cigar and newspaper; creeping up around him are the English Lion, Russian Bear, French Cock, Asian Dragon - and whose Alligator is that under the bed? How can Germany sleep comfortably under these circumstances? Something must be done.

Arthur Davis, the Kaiser's American dentist before and during the war, informs us that, "The German newspaper is gospel to the people. The last word in any argument was always furnished by proof supplied by some newspaper article, Es steht in der Zeitung - liberally translated, "The paper says so" - was always final and conclusive. Nothing the papers declared was too preposterous to be believed." Of course there were many exceptions to the "they believe what they read” stereotype and also that of the passive and obedient average Berliner; exceptions usually privately taken rather than publicly expressed. Of course dissent was increasingly raised in the Reichstag and on the streets by socialists, then by the Spartacus group when the socialists sold out. Nevertheless we are considering a gullible public at the time, even more gullible than the public we find today, for example, in the cynical United States where FOX and CNN deliberately cater to gullible angry white males. Thus we have due cause to suspect that the November Storm in the powerless debating society of the Reichstag was caused not by the public but rather by journalists who wanted to whip up mass support for a more constitutional government, one that would be in fact militantly aggressive in contrast to the Emperor's blustering and his Chancellor's bungling. But the noble right was not ready to give up its privileges quite yet.

The 1905 Morocco Crisis, for instance, was intended for show; the performance given by the Kaiser at Tangier was orchestrated by the Chancellor; the Kaiser went along unwillingly, to be "constitutional", which indicates he was not really the imperious autocrat we might think he was. Although a minor diplomatic success was achieved at the Algeciras Conference, the treaty was deemed an disgraceful failure by the hawkish German eagles. As the Kaiser feared before the show began, his command performance at Tangier was construe d as an intent to wage war. The net result of the First Moroccan Crisis was the extension of the French-English entente from one small part of the world to the whole world, giving Germany even further reason to be paranoid.

The First Moroccan Crisis reminded Germans and Englishmen of the flap over the Kruger Telegram at the outset of the Boer War, when England was Germany's best-hated country and vice versa. Speaking of eagles, we neglected to mention in the previous discussion of the Kaiser's apparent ambivalence during the Boer War, that, although he encouraged President Kruger in the telegram, he refused to see him when the South African leader was raising funds, and worse, he eventually decorated Lord Roberts, Command-in-Chief of the British winning campaign in South Africa, with the German Order of the Black Eagle. The German people were aware of these acts and other expressions of friendship towards the hated English - a great cacophony of disgusted howling ensued. Therefore, the supposed revelation in the 1908 Daily Telegraph of the Kaiser's contradictory support of England during the Boer War was not a revelation at all to Germans capable of remembering events ten years past, brought to mind yet again three years past in Morocco. And not many Germans should have been surprised in 1908 to hear from the Kaiser that, in his friendship with England, he thought he belonged to the "best elements" of society, while the lower and middle classes disliked England. As for his statement that the recommendations he had sent over to England coincided with the British victory over the Boers; that was a silly remark, but we are a silly lot and tend to make much of coincidences. And as for the Kaiser's saber-rattling in the name of commercial peace, what was so new about his trumpeting of the German Navy?

Was the German people's memory so short to have forgotten the last decade or so?  Hardly. Somebody wanted trouble, even war, we think, and they used the press to make it. We remember that Prince von Bulow noted how his November Storm speech in the Reichstag, his verbal spanking of His Highness, had met with righteous applause from Conservatives and National Liberals. The National Liberals were once near the center of the political field, but, as many liberals do once ground is gained, they eventually abandoned their liberal principles and adhered to the conservative position - that strengthening unified German was more important than the principles of freedom, liberty, democracy.

As for the Conservatives, we must not think that they were good bedfellows for the Kaiser simply because he moved hard to the right after flirting with Liberty during Chancellor Caprivi's reforms. William initially supported those reforms while resisting the socialists at the same time, but he had misgivings because of the political reactions; he summoned Caprivi for a one-minute audience on 25 October 1894: "My nerves cannot stand it any more, I must dismiss you." 

Nevertheless, William II had inherited a stubborn liberal streak from his parents although he had rejected them in favor of his grandfather and Bismarck, and it was not that easy for him to consciously overrule his liberal inclination. Even his beloved Prussian grandfather had been pulled a bit to the left by his liberal German wife! Then Bismarck was the hard-nosed Prussian who pushed young William's grandfather, William I, into becoming the "German Emperor" over the Second Reich - William the First did not want the sole Imperial dynasty, preferring to be first among equals as "Emperor of Germany."  And we recall yet again for good measure that Frederick III, father to William II and husband of "that English woman" Victoria Adelaide, Queen Victoria's eldest daughter, was not only liberal but he was also Romantic where his own dynastic ambition was concerned: remember, as Crown Prince, he suggested to Bismarck the restoration of the Roman Empire. Bismarck at first dismissed the notion; he said Crown Prince Frederick was "emperor crazy."  But behold how the romantic power of suggestion came to serve the realistic aims of the Iron Chancellor, the Chancellor young William II would eventually fire when fired to personal sovereignty by his Imperial ambition.

Therefore we find in the last German Emperor diverse influences pulling him in several directions, even though he was a conservative, to say the least, in our current sense of the term. In his day, he was not autocratic enough for the Prussian Court Conservatives - they were his treacherous allies. As for the rest, William II was too autocratic. However that may be, what was coming to the fore in all political parties was the spirit of militant nationalism: Germans were a diverse people, but they loved their newfound unity - the unity in the diversity was in part accomplished by universal military conscription. Their Kaiser with all his internal conflicts suited ordinary Germans quite well whether they approved of his brilliance or hated his awkwardness. For they peered into a mirror, as it were, to get their own bearings. However, in retrospect, we get the impression that there was one issue where Der Kaiser diverged from the general will of his people - the will to wage war. There are astute and reputable historians who believe William was all for war, that he personally conspired to that end while putting off the fatal moment, professing peace until his generals were ready. People who knew the Kaiser and considered him a friend of peace noticed a marked change towards war in him in 1913 - King Albert of Belgium observed that the Kaiser seemed won over by his generals. Yet I am of the camp who believes that, notwithstanding his belligerent posturing designed to cover his weaknesses, William also desired reconciliation and peace. He struggled within and without, against himself and against imperialists of all castes, to keep that peace, and he succeeded for two decades before merely playing soldier finally led him and Germany by the romantic power of suggestion to the real thing.